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May 23, 2006 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee on the subject of post-
grant review procedures. I appear today on my own behalf, as a concerned observer of 
the patent system. 
 
Current patent reform efforts have been accompanied by an often heated exchange of 
views concerning a range of subjects. Despite their differences on other issues, however, 
many observers agree that our current administrative revocation procedures have been 
unsuccessful ventures. Limited use of both ex parte and inter partes reexamination 
procedures have placed both procedures in a state of desuetude. Many actors in the 
technology community view more full-fledged opposition procedures as the best means 
for harnessing the expertise of the PTO to assess the validity of issued patents. Opinions 
differ, however, concerning many of the important details of opposition procedures.  
 
In their efforts to establish an effective opposition system, patent reformers would do 
well to identify clearly its intended goals. Some observers view oppositions as a rather 
cabined curative proceeding that would effectively serve as the final stage of patent 
acquisition procedures. Others view oppositions as low-cost litigation substitutes that 
potentially provide a way to improve quality throughout the nation's entire portfolio of 
issued patents. In addition, in a world where technology knows no borders, we may wish 
our opposition procedure to reflect international norms, thereby serving the laudable goal 
of patent harmonization. Although these policy goals are not mutually exclusive, the 
precise contours of an opposition system follow from those that are selected or 
emphasized. 
 
Allow me to address three aspects of opposition proceedings under current discussion. 
One is whether the availability of oppositions should be subject to time limits. As with 
the European Patent Convention, current proposals before the House of Representatives 
provide for a nine-month period. Debate has proceeded upon whether legislation should 
call for a six-month second window for initiation of an opposition proceeding, based 
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upon receipt of a charge of patent infringement. 
 
Imposing time limits on oppositions has been justified upon notions of stability of the 
property right. Further exploration of this view is appropriate. First, the nine-month 
European deadline is not an absolute one, in the sense that nullity trials and similar 
options remain available under the national laws of European Patent Convention 
signatory states. In the United States, the Patent Act places no time limit upon 
commencing a reexamination. Similarly, under the reissue statute, patent proprietors 
themselves possess the ability to amend their claims at any time during the life of the 
patent. 
 
Time limits may also be motivated by a desire to avoid harassment of patentees. 
Interestingly, experience with the German patent system suggests that such restrictions 
may have the opposite effect. The German law once imposed a five-year deadline upon 
contesting validity of a patent. Observing that many such challenges occurred on the eve 
of the deadline, the time restrictions were ultimately eliminated-reportedly resulting in a 
measurable decrease in the number of oppositions filed. 
 
Strict time limits may also detract from the ability of an opposition to serve as a prompt, 
inexpensive mechanism for assessing a patent's validity. Patents often issue long before 
the inventions they claim become commercially viable. For example, at the time a patent 
claiming a pharmaceutical or medical device issues from the PTO, its proprietor may 
remain engaged in the FDA marketing approval process. Other patents are sold to new 
owners with more aggressive enforcement postures; still others are simply ahead of their 
time. Requiring potential patent challengers to provoke oppositions early in a patent's 
term may lead to ill-informed decisions, to the detriment of patent owners and the public 
alike. As a result, debate over time limits may properly center not upon whether a six-
month second window is justified, but rather upon whether time limits can be justified at 
all. 
 
Second, following the lead of Professor Mark Janis, I encourage the Committee to 
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recognize that the trademark law has for many years allowed for both a pre-grant 
opposition and a post-grant cancellation procedure. In this context, the PTO has 
promulgated rules that incorporate such features as an extensive motions practice, 
hearings, and discovery, including interrogatories, document production, and depositions. 
I do not wish merely to offer the naive suggestion that trademark inter partes procedures 
could simply be adopted wholesale into a patent opposition system. Yet the PTO's 
considerable experience with inter partes proceedings in the context of trademarks should 
both assuage concerns over its institutional competence, and provide valuable guidance 
for patent opposition procedures. 
 
Last, I would encourage the Committee to consider the public goods problems that 
accompany patent oppositions. No matter how refined the contours of an opposition 
system are, individuals may possess limited incentives to employ them. The reason, of 
course, is the general rule that a patent is valid or invalid as to all the world. A firm that 
prevails in a patent opposition must share its success with its marketplace competitors. 
This forced sharing may, of course, lead to a suboptimal level of patent challenges. The 
Hatch-Waxman Act incorporated a 180-day generic exclusivity period in order to address 
this public goods problem; similar attention in the context of patent oppositions may 
ultimately increase their effectiveness. 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I would be pleased to answer 
any questions. 
 
